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ALD-296        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-2578 
____________ 
 
IN RE: JAMES ARTHUR BIGGINS, 
      Petitioner 
 
 __________________________________  
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from  
the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 1-17-cv-01739)  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 21 
August 23, 2018 
 
Before:  MCKEE, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 18, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner James Arthur Biggins petitions for a writ of mandamus.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will deny the petition. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 On July 12, 2018, Biggins filed a petition for writ of mandamus, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, 
in this Court seeking to remove United States District Judge Gregory M. Sleet from 
presiding over his civil action, Biggins v. Minner, D.C. Civ. No. 17-cv-01739, now 
pending in the District of Delaware.  Biggins contends that Judge Sleet is biased against 
him and has been since 2001, based on Biggins’ history of filing numerous lawsuits.  As 
further evidence in support of his claim of personal bias, Biggins notes that we recently 
summarily reversed an order of Judge Sleet’s denying Biggins’ in forma pauperis 
application in D.C. Civ. No. 17-cv-01739.  He also asserts that, in May 2018, he filed a 
motion in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) seeking Judge Sleet’s 
removal.  
 Our review of the proceedings before Judge Sleet reveals the following.  In 
December 2017, Biggins filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
correctional staff deficiencies, medical staff deficiencies, and hazardous environmental 
conditions at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware.  Biggins 
also filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief.  After we reversed his original order, 
Judge Sleet granted Biggins leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this civil rights action.  
Biggins then filed a motion to recuse Judge Sleet.  In an order entered on June 5, 2018, 
Judge Sleet denied the motion for an emergency injunction, dismissed the complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 
20, and granted Biggins leave to amend.  Then, in an order entered on July 20, 2018, 
Judge Sleet denied Biggins’ motion to recuse on the ground that no reasonable person 
with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that his (Judge Sleet’s) impartiality might 
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reasonably be questioned.  The civil docket further reveals that the case was reassigned to 
District Judge Richard G. Andrews on July 25, 2018. 
 We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  A mandamus petition is the 
proper means for this Court to review a District Judge’s refusal to disqualify himself from 
a case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.  In re: School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 776-
78 (3d Cir. 1992).  However, the petitioner must show that § 455 clearly and 
indisputably, see Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992), required 
the District Judge to disqualify himself.  If not, we are not required to issue a writ of 
mandamus directing him to do so.  In re: School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d at 778.  
Section 455(a) of title 28 provides that: “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”  28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  Section 455(b)(1) provides that a judge 
shall also disqualify himself where “he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]”  
28 U.S.C. § 455.   
We are satisfied that Judge Sleet, in his thorough opinion denying the motion to 
recuse, arrived at a legally sound conclusion that Biggins’ allegations against him do not 
provide a basis for disqualification either because his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned or because he is biased.  As explained by Judge Sleet, Biggins takes exception 
to the court’s rulings and that is the primary reason he seeks recusal, but “judicial rulings 
alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion,” Liteky v. 
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United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994), and they specifically do not do so here.1  
Furthermore, to the extent that Biggins disagrees with Judge Sleet’s order dismissing his 
complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and failure to comply with 
Rule 20, mandamus, with its “exceedingly narrow” scope of review, is not a substitute for 
an appeal.  In re: Chambers Development Co., Inc., 148 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting In re: Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997)).  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 
                                              
1 In any event, it appears from the civil docket that Biggins’ request for mandamus relief 
is moot.  If indeed his case has been reassigned to a different United States District Judge, 
we would be unable to fashion any form of meaningful relief.  See General Electric Co. 
v. Cathcart, 980 F.2d 927, 934 (3d Cir. 1992). 
